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Absent a drug or vaccine, containing epidemic outbreaks is achieved by means
of social distancing, specifically mobility restrictions and lock-downs. Such mea-
sures impose a hurtful toll on the economy, and are difficult to sustain for ex-
tended periods. As an alternative, we propose here an alternating quarantine
strategy, in which at every instance, half of the population remains under lock-
down while the other half continues to be active, maintaining a routine of weekly
succession between activity and quarantine. This regime affords a dual partition:
half of the population interacts for only half of the time, resulting in a dramatic
reduction in transmission, comparable to that achieved by a population-wide
lock-down. All the while, it enables socioeconomic continuity at 50% capacity.
The proposed weekly alternations also address an additional challenge, with spe-
cific relevance to COVID-19. Indeed, SARS-CoV-2 exhibits a relatively long in-
cubation period, in which individuals experience no symptoms, but may already
contribute to the spread. Unable to selectively isolate these invisible spread-
ers, we resort to population-wide restrictions. However, under the alternating
quarantine routine, if an individual was exposed during their active week, by
the time they complete their quarantine they will, in most cases, begin to ex-
hibit symptoms. Hence this strategy isolates the majority of pre-symptomatic
individuals during their infectious phase, leading to a rapid decline in the viral
spread, thus addressing one of the main challenges in COVID-19 mitigation.
Battling the spread of SARS-CoV-2, most countries have resorted to social distancing policies,
imposing restrictions [1], from complete lock-downs, to severe mobility constraints [2–5], gravely
impacting socioeconomic stability and growth. Current observations indicate that such policies
must be put in place for extended periods (typically months) to avoid reemergence of the epi-
demic once lifted [6–8]. This, however, may be unsustainable, as individual social and economic
needs will, at some point surpass the perceived risk of the pandemic [9].
More broadly, these events have exposed our vulnerability - socially and economically - to
the emergence of novel infectious pathogens [10], calling on us to design socioeconomically
sustainable response protocols, in the absence of therapeutic interventions. We, therefore,
examine here an alternating quarantine (AQ) strategy, tailored and tested for our immediate
threat of COVID-19, but equally relevant to other pandemic spreading scenarios.
The AQ strategy is based on two principles: (i) Complete isolation of symptomatic individuals
and their household members [1]; (ii) Partitioning of the remaining households into two cohorts
that undergo weekly successions of quarantine and routine activity. Other periodic cycles, e.g.,
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bi-weekly, or 5 working days vs. 9 quarantine days, may also be considered. The partition, we
emphasize, must be at household level, guaranteeing all cohabitants are in the same cohort.
Hence while Cohort 1 remains active, Cohort 2 stays at home and vice versa, ensuring little
interaction between the cohorts (Fig. 1d). This provides a highly efficient mitigation, alongside
continuous socioeconomic productivity, in which half of the workforce remains active at each
point in time.
The AQ strategy limits social mixing [11], while providing an outlet for people to sustain their
economic and social routines. Its efficiency is rooted in two independent mitigating effects:
• Dual-partition of population and time (Fig. 5). Splitting the population into two isolated
cohorts reduces the number of infectious encounters. Indeed, classrooms, offices and public
places operate at half their usual density, and hence, individuals interact with only half their
usual contacts. On top of that, as each cohort is only active for half of the time, one week out
of two, the infections within each cohort are further reduced, roughly by an additional factor of
one half.
This dual-partition effect, relevant for any general pandemic, is reinforced by an additional
factor, unique to COVID-19:
• Synchronization with disease cycle (Fig. 1). AQ’s weekly alternations treat one of the main
obstacles for COVID-19 mitigation - the fact that while we isolate the symptomatic patients,
exposed individuals become infectious a few days prior to the onset of symptoms [12–17] (Fig.
1a). During this pre-symptomatic stage, they behave as invisible spreaders, who continue to
interact with their network, unaware of their potential infectiousness [18–25]. To illustrate AQ’s
remedy, consider an individual in Cohort 1 who was active during week 1, and therefore might
have been infected. This individual will soon enter their pre-symptomatic stage, precisely the
stage in which they are invisible, and hence contribute most to the spread. However, according
to the AQ routine, they will be confined to their homes during week 2, and consequently, they
will be isolated precisely during their suspected pre-symptomatic period. If, by the end of week
2 they continue to show no symptoms, most chances are that they are, in fact, healthy, and can,
therefore, resume activity in week 3 according to the planned routine. Conversely, if they do
develop symptoms during their quarantine, they (and their cohabitants) must remain in isola-
tion, similar to all symptomatic individuals. Hence, the weekly succession is in resonance with
the natural SARS-CoV-2 disease cycle [26], and in practice, leads to isolation of the majority of
invisible spreaders. If implemented fully, it guarantees, in each bi-weekly cycle, to prune out the
infectious individuals and sustain an active workforce comprising a predominantly uninfected
population.
Using COVID-19 as our test case, we examine below the performance of AQ, and discuss
practical aspects pertaining to its implementation, from guidelines on how to partition the
social network to the treatment of limited social compliance.
Analysis
Modeling the spread of SARS-CoV-2
Social network. We constructed a population of N ∼ 104 individuals, comprising M = 4×103
separate households, and tracked their sequence of social interactions at 15 minute resolution
over the course of T = 150 days. These interactions are governed by two separate networks: day-
time interactions at work, school or other public places are driven by the external network Aij .
This represents an N × N network with degree distribution P (k), designed to capture out-of-
home social activity (Fig. 2a, orange). In-house interactions, taking place predominantly during
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the after-hours, are governed by Bij , a network of M isolated cliques, capturing households (Fig.
2a, blue). The size of these cliques m is extracted from the empirically obtained [27] household
size distribution P (m).
To capture the temporal nature of the interactions, each link in Aij and Bij switches between
periods of activity, i.e. collocation of i and j, vs. intermittent periods, in which the link remains
idle. Infection between i and j may occur during the instances in which the i, j link is active.
These instances of activity/inactivity, extracted at random, represent the sporadic nature of
human interaction, and allow us to track the viral spread under highly realistic conditions. To
design a typical daily cycle, the external links Aij are predominantly active during the day
(Fig. 2c), while in-house interactions occur primarily at the evening/night-time hours (Fig.
2d). During quarantine, such as under the AQ routine, or if a household member i exhibits
symptoms, the relevant Aij links remain idle, while Bij becomes activated also during the day.
Each of the networks Aij and Bij is characterized by two independent parameters (Fig. 2b).
The first captures the probability of link-activation at each 15 minute interval, determining the
links’ mean daily duration of activity. We denote this duration by T1 for Aij and T2 for Bij .
Realistically we expect T1 < T2, capturing the fact that cohabitants, when at home, spend
more time in potentially infectious interactions than, e.g., office-mates during work hours. The
second parameter is the probability of transmission per interaction, set to p1 and p2 for Aij and
Bij respectively. Also here we assume that typically p1 < p2, as in-house interactions, often
between family members, are potentially more infectious than the social interactions of Aij . For
example, parents tending to children or siblings interacting physically, are more likely to lead
to infection, than co-workers sharing a meeting room.
Disease cycle. In Fig. 1a we present the SARS-CoV-2 characteristic infection cycle. Upon
exposure (E) individuals enter a pre-symptomatic period, which lasts, on average ∼ 5 days,
after which they begin to exhibit mild (IM ), severe (IS) or critical (IC) symptoms, leading to
hospitalization (H), and in certain cases also to ventilation (V ). Approximately 2 days prior
to the onset of symptoms the exposed individuals become infectious, hence, on average, the
infectious phase begins 3 days after initial exposure [12]. Spreading the virus continues until
the onset of symptoms, at which point the infected individuals, together with their cohabi-
tants, enter isolation and cease to contribute to the external spread (Aij). Of course, in-house
transmission (Bij) continues also during home-isolation. A fraction of the exposed individuals
remain asymptomatic (AS), and hence do not isolate, throughout their entire infectious period,
beginning on average 4 days posterior to exposure [28]. Hence, the symptomatic carriers spread
the disease within an average window of ∼ 2 days (purple), while the asymptomatic carriers
continue to infect others until their immune response clears the virus.
These time-scales represent the average infection cycle, which, in reality, may exhibit variability
across the population [14–17, 28–31]. This is especially relevant regarding the time for the
appearance of symptoms, which, if delayed beyond 1 − 2 weeks, may lead to an infectious
crossover between successive terms of activity, e.g., if a person is infected in week 1, and then,
lacking symptoms, resumes activity in week 3 (see Fig. 1d). Therefore, for each of the relevant
time-scales, e.g., the time from exposure to infectiousness, or the time to develop symptoms, we
consider not just the average, but the complete distribution across the population (Fig. 1c). For
example, the probability density function P1(t
′) captures the fraction of exposed individual who
exhibit symptoms within t ∈ (t′, t′+ dt′) days from exposure. Similarly, P2(t′) characterizes the
transition times between exposure and asymptomatic infectiousness. The broader are Pi(t
′),
the greater is the individual variability in transition times between the different disease states.
Here we extract Pi(t
′) from a Weibull distribution, as indicated for SARS-CoV-2 [16, 17, 32],
and observed also for other infections of Corona type viruses [28]; see Supplementary Sections
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1.3 and 4.1.
Characterizing the spread (Fig. 2b). Taken together, our modeling framework is designed to
capture the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in a detailed fashion, therefore, characterized by an array of
relevant parameters. The majority of these parameters can be extracted from empirical data.
For example, the transition rates of Fig. 1a’s disease cycle, or the household size distribution
P (m), helping us structure Bij - are all empirically accessible. The remaining parameters
P (k), T1, T2, p1, p2, however, are unknown. Hence, we examine different spreading scenarios to
examine our strategy’s sensitivity to discrepancies is these parameters. For instance, we consider
both a random Aij , for which P (k) is bounded, and a scale-free Aij , where P (k) is fat-tailed
(Supplementary section 2). Similarly, we assign different values to T1 and T2 to examine variable
balance between in-house and external transmission.
Once these unknown parameters are set, they help characterize the spread along two dimensions
(Fig. 2b):
• The growth rate β, quantifies the level of spread by tracking the initial exponential proliferation
of infections
I(t) ∼ eβt, (1)
observed at the early stages of the outbreak. Here I(t) = IM (t) + IS(t) + IC(t) is the number
of symptomatic infected individuals. The greater is β the more rapid is the spread, hence β
increases with T1, T2, p1 and p2, all of which contribute to the infectiousness of the disease. The
density of the network, i.e. its average external degree 〈k〉 and household size 〈m〉 also both
positively contribute to β, as they allow more potential infectious interactions. This parameter
is directly related to the disease’s doubling time [28, 29] via TDouble ∼ β−1 ln 2.
• The in-house infection rate α, captures the balance between the contribution of Bij vs. Aij
to the spread. To quantify this balance we track all instances of transmission θTot, and extract
θIn, which counts only the cases transmitted via Bij links, i.e. in-house. We then measure the
in-house infection rate as
α =
θIn
θTot
(2)
namely the fraction of transmissions that occurred at home.
Similarly to β, the parameter α is also dictated by the network parameters. A large T2 and p2
will favor in-house transmissions, contributing to α, whereas increasing T1, p1 will strengthen
the role of external transmissions. The network structure also factors in through the average
number of external links 〈k〉, decreasing α, vs. the typical household size 〈m〉, which increases it.
This parameter is especially meaningful in the context of quarantine-based strategies, which,
by design, suppress only θTot, and therefore become less effective when θIn is large. Indeed,
no matter how strict the quarantine is, it cannot prevent the secondary transmission between
household members encapsulated within θIn. In fact, it often increases these in-house infections,
as it forces cohabitants to remain close for extended periods. Consequently, a large α can
potentially hinder the effectiveness of quarantine in general, and of AQ in particular.
To summarize, in our modeling we vary the implicit model parameters T1, p1, T2, p2, P (k), to
scan an array of potentially relevant scenarios. Once setting these parameters, we use them
to extract two observable parameters α and β, that directly characterize the nature of the
contagion. The severity of the spread is quantified by β, and the role of in-house transmission is
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captured by α. The mapping between the model parameters and the observable α, β is explained
in Supplementary Sections 1.4.
Projecting the spread of SARS-CoV-2
To evaluate β for the unmitigated COVID-19 spread we collected data on the evolution of the
epidemic in 12 different countries [33], and examined I(t) at the early stages of the spread, prior
to the implementation of social distancing policies (Fig. 3a-l). Fitting to an exponential growth
of the form (1) we evaluate β in each country, obtaining a mean growth rate of β = 0.26 days−1,
an estimate congruent with other independent evaluations [28, 29]. Setting, as a baseline α = 0
(to be changed below) we can now obtain a projection of the expected evolution of the epidemic
(Fig. 3n). We also track the expected fraction of hospitalized (H(t)) and ventilated (V (t))
individuals (Fig. 3o), which, we find, exceed, by a significant margin, the average national
hospitalization capabilities [34]. The expected mortality is captured by D(t → ∞) reaching,
absent any mitigation efforts, a level of ∼ 3% (grey).
Next, we examine the behavior of COVID-19 under AQ, together with other relevant strategies.
Mitigation
To examine the impact of our proposed strategy we track the evolution of I(t) = IM (t) +
IS(t) + IC(t). First we allow the disease to spread unmitigated (Fig. 4a, orange, UM), then at
time t = t0 (Supplementary Section 1.2) we instigate our response. Examining four relevant
mitigation strategies, we establish a basis upon which to evaluate AQ’s performance.
Full quarantine - FQ (Fig. 4a-f, grey). This represents the theoretically ideal response, in
which all out of home activity is ceased. The external links Aij become inactive and only in-
house transmission (Bij) remains, until these secondary infections are also exhausted and the
spread reaches a halt. To capture the effect of this in-house perpetuation of the disease we
consider several scenarios, from vanishing in-house transmission (Fig. 4a, α = 0) to extreme
levels of household infections (4e, α = 0.32). As expected, absent in-house transmission, FQ
eradicates the disease extremely efficiently, within∼ 3 weeks. As α is increased, FQ, expectantly,
shows a slight decline in efficiency [8]. Of course, such perfect air-tight quarantine is unrealistic,
however, it is useful in the present context, as it provides a baseline for comparison, indeed,
setting the bounds for a perfect mitigation.
Alternating quarantine - AQ (Fig. 4a-f, blue). We now examine the AQ strategy. At t = t0
we partition the households into two equal groups, cohorts 1 and 2, and have them alternating
successively in a bi-weekly cycle of quarantine, i.e. only Bij is active, and regular socioeconomic
activity, namely Aij and Bij are active. We find, again, that I(t) decays exponentially, albeit
at a slower rate, as compared to the prefect FQ. The crucial point, however, is that this decay
is now observed, despite the fact that 50% of the population remains continuously active.
For comparison, we consider two natural alternatives to AQ, both designed to sustain socioe-
conomic activity at a 50% rate:
Intermittent quarantines - IQ (Fig. 4a-f, turquoise). In this strategy [35] society as a whole
enters a periodic cycle of active vs. quarantined phases, namely the entire population transitions
in unison between staying at home and going to work. Originally proposed in the format of a
4 : 10 periodicity, i.e. 4 days of activity separated by 10 days of quarantine, here we examine its
performance under a 7 : 7 cycle, to be congruent with our implementation of AQ. We find that
IQ is significantly less effective than AQ, leading not only to higher peak infection, but also to
a substantially longer time to return to normalcy.
Half quarantine - HQ (Fig. 4a-f, red). Another mitigation alternative that allows a 50% active
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workforce is based on a selective quarantine, in which only 50% of the population partakes in
socioeconomic activities, while the remaining half is instructed to stay at home. HQ suppresses
the rate of infection by reducing social interactions, i.e. Aij , by a factor of roughly one half.
Our simulation results indicate, however, that, similarly to IQ, this reduction is insufficient.
Indeed, I(t) continues to proliferate significantly beyond manageable levels, once again, failing
to mitigate the disease.
While the majority of infected individuals exhibit mild or no symptoms, a certain percentage
may experience severe complications, leading to hospitalization or ventilation, and in some
cases to mortality (Fig. 1a). Our mitigation strategy focuses on these undesired paths within
the infection track - namely, we aim to decrease mortality D(t), and ensure that at their peak,
H(t) and V (t) do not exceed the national hospitalization and ventilation capabilities. To test
this we measured the residual mortality
∆D = DS(t→∞)−DFQ(t→∞) (3)
where DS(t → ∞) is the long term mortality under strategy S, e.g., IQ or AQ, and DFQ(t →
∞) is the expected mortality under FQ. Indeed, within the framework of quarantine-based
strategies, DFQ(t → ∞) represents inevitable deaths, rooted in infections that occurred prior
to our response, and hence ∆D captures the additional mortality, that our mitigation failed to
prevent. In Fig. 4b,d,f we measure ∆D under IQ (turquoise), HQ (red) and AQ (blue). The
AQ advantage is clearly visible, saving significantly more lives than the competing strategies.
To examine the impact of each strategy on the severe and critical patients, we measure
HPeak =
∞
max
t=t0
H(t), (4)
capturing the peak hospital occupancy after instigating our response. While IQ and HQ fail
to bring HPeak within capacity (∼ 3 × 10−3), AQ succeeds in sustaining a leveled occupancy.
Similar results are also obtained for VPeak = max
∞
t=t0 V (t).
Taken together, we find that AQ provides the most efficient mitigation, bringing us closest
to the ideal performance of FQ, without fully shutting down the economy. To understand
the origins of the observed AQ advantage, we first consider its alternatives, IQ and HQ.
The common root of both strategies is that they reduce the level of interaction by a factor
of one half. IQ achieves this by decreasing the interaction duration; HQ accomplishes this
by diluting the interacting population. In this sense, the strength of AQ is that it benefits
from both factors (Fig. 5): partitioning the population into cohorts ensures that only half
are active at all times - similar to HQ. Yet, the weekly alternations ensure that each cohort
remains active only half the time - similar to IQ. This dual partition further reduces infectious
interactions without increasing the socioeconomic toll. On top of that, AQ is also tailored
specifically to the COVID-19 time-scales, with its weekly periodicity, roughly in-phase with
the natural ∼ 5 day cycle of incubation and pre-symptomatic infection (Fig. 1d). The result
is an effective force multiplier, allowing the same amount of net activity - 50% - but with a
dramatically enforced mitigation effect.
Synergistic measures
Our analysis, up to this point, assumed a worst case scenario, in which, aside from our mitigation
strategy (AQ, IQ or HQ), all other disease parameters remain unchanged. In reality, however, in
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addition to AQ, or any other strategy for that matter, we can expect, at the least, that standard
prophylactic behaviors will continue to be practiced. Indeed, personal hygiene, face-masks and
contact avoidance can reduce infections significantly, without taking any toll on the economy.
Therefore, in practice, the infection rate β = 0.26, inferred in Fig. 3 from the early, pre-
mitigation stages of the epidemic, will likely be reduced as we gradually adapt to a prophylactic
routine. We, therefore, examine the performance of the different mitigation strategies also under
a reduced β, capturing the synergistic effect offered by such practices. In the intermediate case
we set β ≈ 0.21, a ∼ 20% reduction in the rate of infection (Fig. 4g - l), and as our best case
scenario, we examined β ≈ 0.15, capturing a ∼ 40% drop in infectiousness (Fig. 4m - r). Under
these more favorable conditions, AQ’s performance approaches even closer to the ideal FQ (e.g.,
Fig. 4g or m), providing a dramatic reduction in mortality and hospitalization.
More generally, our AQ strategy can, and should, be reinforced by other complementary policies,
to ensure mitigation success, from avoiding social gatherings to establishing isolation facilities,
with the purpose of reducing in-house transmission. As a specifically relevant example, we
consider, in Supplementary Section 3, the selective protection of vulnerable populations, ad-
dressing a crucial aspect of COVID-19, whose impact on the elderly or on individuals with
co-morbidities, is disproportionately more severe [36–38].
All of these policies can be instigated alongside, rather than instead, of AQ. One may also
consider alternative periodic cycles [35]. For instance, a 5 : 9 cycle, in which the active shifts
last only 5 days. In this version of AQ, society enters a routine in which each cohort is allowed a
5 day work-week, then observes population-wide quarantine over the weekend. Such adaptations
will further improve the performance of AQ beyond its already established effectiveness.
Population-wide testing (Fig. 6). Thanks to the synchronization with the disease cycle, each
weekly quarantine filters out a fraction of the infected individuals. It is therefore natural to
reinforce this filtering with systematic testing of the quarantined cohort before they resume
activity. If an individual is detected positive, their entire household must remain in isolation
until all members are cleared. To examine this effect we added a component of random testing
to both AQ and IQ. Given limited resources, we assume a testing capacity of a χ-fraction of the
population per week. As expected, the greater is χ the more effective is our mitigation (Fig.
6a,b).
The crucial point, however, is that AQ’s breakdown of the population into separated cohorts
provides an intrinsic advantage. Indeed, testing is most effective when conducted on the quar-
antined cohort, whose state is frozen during the week. One can then spread the testing across
the entire week, and detect infected individuals before they return to activity. Hence, the fact
that one only needs to focus on half of the population at a time, enhances the effectiveness of
such a testing policy. To understand this, consider the case where χ ≈ 0.5, namely we have the
capacity to test 50% of the population within a single week. Under these conditions, thanks to
AQ’s partitioning, one can simply invest all tests in the inactive cohort, then resume activity
in week 2 with a guaranteed clean workforce.
To examine this advantage we focus specifically on the case where χ = 0.5. We apply the tests
selectively to the quarantined cohort in each shift, which, indeed, constitutes roughly half of
the population (minor discrepancies arise due to statistical variations, and uneven household
sizes). Within a one week cycle we arrive at an almost 100% uninfected active workforce, after
which the only bottleneck for the decay of I(t) is the residual in-house infections. In that sense,
after approximately 1−2 weeks, AQ becomes as effective as FQ. Indeed, Fig. 6c shows that AQ
(blue) exhibits the same rate of I(t) decay as FQ (grey), albeit at a 10 day delay, precisely the
predicted 1−2 weeks. Hence, extensive testing provides a crucial complement to AQ, potentially
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achieving FQ mitigation efficiency, without crippling socioeconomic activity.
Alternating vs. population-wide quarantine
The proven advantages of AQ indicate that it is not merely an alternative to IQ or HQ, both par-
tial quarantine strategies, but may actually be confronted against a population-wide quarantine
(PWQ). For example, a PWQ at rate η requires an η fraction of the population to continuously
practice quarantine, hence in HQ we have η = 50% and in FQ we have η = 100%.
Intuitively, one would expect a PWQ with η > 50% to be more effective than AQ, both in terms
of mitigation - isolating larger parts of the population, as well as in terms of implementation -
not having to resolve between the two cohorts. Our analysis, however, indicates that AQ has
crucial advantages on both fronts. The implementation challenge of PWQ is that it requires
people to stay at home for a period of several weeks, in order for the mitigation to take effect. For
example, in Fig. 4a we found that an η = 100% perfectly implemented quarantine (FQ), which
is, indeed, a theoretical construction only, still required several weeks to achieve a significant
gain over the disease [8]. Under these conditions, one cannot implement a truly complete lock-
down. Essential services, supply chains and some parts of the market must remain active,
since households cannot retain supplies and remain self-sufficient for such extended periods.
Therefore, a practical PWQ can at most be implemented at a level of η = 70− 75% [39].
In contrast, the AQ scheme requires individuals to isolate only for a single week at a time.
Hence, the quarantined cohort can truly enter, for just one week, a complete lock-down regime,
in which they avoid purchasing supplies or any other services. Consequently, under AQ, while
a larger part of the population is active at all times, the quarantined cohort, can sustain a
much stricter lock-down routine. As a result not only is the economy more productive, with
50% of the population continuously active, but the mitigation outcome is also comparable, and
under some conditions even superior. To demonstrate this, in Fig. 7 we examine the impact of
PWQ, imposed at a level of η = 50, 60, 70 and 75% (red to yellow). AQ, we find, is roughly the
equivalent of a 70% lock-down (blue). Note that η = 70 − 75% represent the practical upper
bound for any realistic PWQ. Yet whereas PWQ at such levels severely compromises the econ-
omy and imposes significant social and psychological stress, AQ accomplishes a similar effect,
while sustaining a productive economy, and allowing a manageable routine for the individual.
Implementation
Partitioning. The AQ strategy works best when the two cohorts are fully separated, lacking all
forms of cross-group infection. The partition should, therefore, be implemented at a household
level, ensuring all cohabitants are in the same activity/quarantine cycle. A simple way to achieve
this is to base the partition on a person’s living address. This provides an additional benefit, in
the case of apartment buildings, as neighbors, who risk cross-infection through shared building
facilities, are included in the same cohort. Each individual/household will be informed by their
local authority of their quarantine schedule, and in parallel, employers will be instructed to
resume their activity in shifts, with only half the workforce at a time. Businesses will be held
legally liable and incur fines in case of violation.
Instances of conflict between a person’s assigned shift and their personal/employer’s specific
requirements will be resolved on a case by case basis - all while strictly adhering to the household-
based partition. To encourage cooperation, and to ensure AQ’s smooth implementation, it is
best to be as flexible as possible in responding to all individual requests. The resulting cohorts,
after accommodating such requests, will likely deviate from an exact balanced cut, however,
the crucial point is, that the partition need not be perfect, as, indeed, the cohorts must be
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decoupled, but not necessarily equal in size. Therefore, there is much room to address specific
constraints or special needs, thus easing the psychological and socioeconomic stress as much as
possible. See Box I for a smooth partitioning scheme.
Social compliance. To engage the population towards cooperation [40], the first step is to
communicate the rationale behind AQ, its potential effectiveness, and the individual compliance
required for its rapid success. This appeals to people’s intrinsic motivation [41], a crucial
component of conformity, but often also insufficient due to the tragedy of the commons. We
therefore list the drivers, that enhance people’s desire to cooperate, vs. the inhibitors, that
stand in their way [42, 43], and set appropriate moderators to enforce the drivers and suppress
the inhibitors (Fig. 8).
Inhibitors (Fig. 8a). During its lock-down cycle, the quarantined cohort is required to stay
at home for one week, indeed, a challenge, however, being limited in time, it is significantly
less stressful than an extended several week quarantine. We identify four motivators to violate
the quarantine: Business - going to work, Schooling - arrangements for child care, Services and
supplies - visiting public market places or service centers, and Outdoors - exercise or strolling
with children or pets. Of these, the latter, being in the open, is least risky, and also practically
unavoidable, as young children and pets require routine outdoor activity. We, therefore, focus
on moderators especially for the first three inhibitors.
Moderators (Fig. 8c). While cooperation can be achieved via coercion, e.g., law enforcement,
it is most effectively garnered by creating supporting frameworks. For example, in the AQ
framework, defection for business and schools is simply not possible. Indeed, since businesses
are legally required to divide their workforce into shifts, one cannot go to work out of cycle.
Similarly, schools will not admit children who are not in the presently active cohort. Therefore,
the main challenge is to deter violators from visiting public places for supplies or services.
This can be achieved by (i) instructing the population to prepare in advance for a full week
of isolation; (ii) establishing a logistic and psychological support network to aid citizens who
encounter unexpected needs; (iii) creating a dedicated app to issue exit permits only to members
of the active cohort. The app in (iii) will not violate citizen privacy in any way, but only indicate
if the device holder is in Cohort 1 or 2. Residents will be asked to present their app to enter
shopping centers or public institutions. This can be done in addition to testing for symptoms,
as already practiced in many countries.
Together, the proposed moderators create a framework that not only diminishes incentives for
defection, e.g., by logistically supporting the isolated cohort, but also eliminates the means,
as, indeed, aside from daily outdoor strolling, practically all other out of home activities are
automatically barred by the AQ framework itself. The strength of this implementation plan is
that it achieves this without coercion, namely that almost no enforcement via authorized forces
against individuals is required, maintaining a level of trust between citizen and government and
securing personal freedoms. To complete the plan, at the end of the isolation week, all isolated
residents will be required to report their health status via the app. Those who report symptoms,
as well as their cohabitants, will remain at their stay-home status, going into isolation until their
verified recovery.
Defectors and essential workers (Fig. 8d-f). Despite this detailed implementation plan, some
level of violation of the AQ regime is unavoidable. This is either due to partial compliance, i.e.
defectors, or because certain individuals hold essential positions and cannot leave their post for
an entire week. Therefore, we now introduce a fraction f of continuously active individuals,
defectors or essential workers, who remain active at all times, both during their open shift
as well as when their cohort is under quarantine. This f -fraction is extracted from the non-
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symptomatic (S,E, IAS) or mild symptomatic (IM ) population, who may conceal their state.
Excluded, however, are individuals experiencing severe symptoms (IS , IC , H, V ) who, of course,
remain isolated. Measuring our performance indicators, ∆D (3), HPeak (4) and VPeak, we find
that AQ can sustain defection/exemption up to f ∼ 0.2, a 20% non-conformity level. Beyond
that, we observe a significant decline in the strategy’s performance.
Discussion
The efficiency of the AQ strategy is rooted in three principles: (i) Partitioning the population
into two cohorts reduces the volume of infectious interactions, comparable to a 50% quarantine
(HQ). (ii) Working in weekly succession reduces the total duration of interaction within each
cohort, similar to intermittent quarantines (IQ). Combining these two factors together, allows
a similar net volume of socioeconomic activity as in any of these strategies, HQ or IQ, but
with a multiplied mitigation effect. While (i) and (ii) are independent of the succession period,
e.g., daily or weekly, our design of AQ around weekly alternations provides a third advantage:
(iii) It synchronizes the quarantine phase with the suspected incubation period of each cohort,
hence systematically pruning out the invisible SARS-CoV-2 spreaders. Such synchronization
can readily generalize to other infections, by accordingly tuning the AQ periodicity.
Alternating quarantine can be implemented as an exit strategy, following a period of suppression
via population-wide quarantine. As such, it allows a gradual reigniting of a dormant economy,
while minimizing the risk of a recurring outbreak. However, our results indicate that it can also
serve as a primary mitigation strategy, with comparable impact to that of a strict population-
wide quarantine (Fig. 7). AQ should be further enforced with complementary measures, such
as testing (Fig. 6) and selective protection of vulnerable populations (Supplementary Section
3).
A crucial strength of AQ is its robustness against defection, under some conditions withstanding
as much as 20% violators. Nevertheless, we believe that the weekly relief, allowing people an out-
let to continue their activity for half of the time, may, itself, increase cooperation levels. Indeed,
while a complete lock-down is extremely stressful for the individual, the AQ bi-weekly routine
relaxes the burden, and may encourage compliance. Moreover, with workplaces and schools
forced to operate in fully partitioned shifts, and with our suggested mobile app and logistic
support network, the implementation of AQ has little dependence neither on self-motivation
nor on externally enforced cooperation (Fig. 8). Indeed, schools and employment will naturally
drive the population between activity and inactivity, with enforcement only required to treat
outdoor recreation - which, in any case, has little contribution to the infection.
More broadly, we consider the fact that there is, inherently, some level of uncertainty regarding
the disease parameters. We therefore examined the worst case scenario, in which the infection
rate during the active weeks is the same as that of the pre-mitigation spread. In practice,
however, we expect many additional measures to be implemented in parallel to the quaran-
tines, such as extended testing for infections, face-masks and strict hygienic regulations at the
workplace. At the least, we expect standard prophylactic behavior, such as avoiding contact or
banning social gatherings, to be observed also during each cohort’s active week. Such norms,
that will continue until COVID-19 is fully eradicated, will further push down β, enhancing the
effectiveness of our strategy even beyond the reported results.
Here, we have mainly discussed the epidemiological merits of AQ, and its implementation, in
broad strokes, as a national strategy. In practice, different societies, as well as different eco-
nomic sectors, will require specific adaptations. For example, while AQ is naturally compatible
with non-professional industries, in which workers can be arbitrarily partitioned into shifts, it
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becomes more challenging in professional workplaces, where key personnel may be irreplaceable.
Specific solutions, therefore, must be tailored to accommodate different economies and sectors.
In light of AQ’s unambiguous mitigating advantage, we believe such adaptations are, by far,
worth the effort.
Data availability. All codes to reproduce, examine and improve our proposed analysis are
available at https://github.com/drormeidan/ALDCOVID19.
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Box I. Smooth partitioning. Assigning all individuals into cohorts may seem to require
coordination that is difficult to scale at a national or regional level. Here, we offer a scheme
to naturally achieve a smooth partition, minimizing both economic and individual stress •
Employers. Will be allowed to resume activity, conditional on working in fully-separated
shifts. They will be given time to partition their workforce into two cohorts, E1 and E2,
optimal for their business considerations. During this time, employers can also make other
arrangements, such as training workers from E1 to substitute for those in E2, etc. • Local
authority. Will inform all citizens of their cohort assignment, R1 or R2, based on, e.g., living
address. Employers will update their lists E1, E2 accordingly •Conflict resolution. Conflicts
can arise either due to employer needs or to individual preferences. For example, if an employer
detects an unbridgeable discrepancy between the official assignment of a worker (R1, R2) and
their professional needs (E1, E2). Similarly, an individual may wish to switch cohort for
personal reasons, e.g., to tend for a family member in the opposite cohort. To resolve such
conflicts, citizens will be given the opportunity, until a preset date Tf , to file for transition,
of their entire household, between R1 and R2. The local authority will update their lists
accordingly, informing schools and other relevant institutions of the transition • Flexibility.
The result is a friction-less scheme, essentially accommodating all transition requests. This
is enabled thanks to the fact that AQ does not require a precise 50 : 50 partitioning. Hence,
to allow a smooth and efficient split, both for the individual and for employers, the scheme is
designed to be as flexible as possible • No micro-management. By the deadline Tf society
will naturally be divided into two cohorts, in which all employees/employers are granted their
ideal work schedule. The local authorities need not micro-manage this partitioning, just track
it. Once the partition is set at Tf , no further transitions are enabled.
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FIG. 1: The cycles of SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 vs. those of the Alternating quarantine
strategy. (a) We collected data on the transitions between the SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 states
and constructed the characteristic disease cycle. Upon exposure (E) individuals enter an average 5
day incubation period prior to developing symptoms - mild (IM at a rate of 55%), severe (IS , 10%) or
critical (IC , 5%). The remaining ∼ 30% are asymptomatic (AS). Infectiousness begins typically 3 days
after exposure for symptomatic carriers, and 4 days for the asymptomatic (AS). The infection window
(violet) captures the invisible pre-symptomatic (PS) spreading phase, in which individuals are infectious,
but lack symptoms. Upon the onset of symptoms, infected individuals are isolated and cease to infect
others. Consequently, asymptomatic individuals have a longer infection window, which extends until their
transition to R. As the disease progresses a fraction of the infected population may require hospitalization
(H) or ventilation (V ), leading, with some probability to mortality (D). (b) The compartments of the
COVID-19 cycle. We denote by I(t) the unity of all symptomatic individuals (I = IM + IS + IC). This
corresponds to the diagnosed case count in each country (Fig. 3), which covers mainly the patients who
exhibit symptoms. (c) While the illustrated cycle in (a) captures the average transition times between
all states, in reality, some level of variability exists across the population. This is captured by the
distribution Pi(t
′). For example the individual transition time from E to PS, whose average is 3 days,
is extracted from P1(t
′) (purple). (d) Alternating quarantine (AQ) splits the population into separate
cohorts that alternate between periods of activity (going to work, blue) and inactivity (staying at home,
red). Following their active week (week 1) individuals in Cohort 1 may become exposed (yellow), in
which case they will sit out their suspected pre-symptomatic period at home (week 2). By the end of
their quarantine week they will likely develop symptoms (orange) and remain in isolation until their
full recovery. Those who did not develop symptoms during their week of quarantine are most likely
uninfected (blue) and can resume activity in their upcoming active shift (week 3). Therefore the AQ
cycle behaves as a ratchet, consistently quarantining the invisible spreaders, and hence, removing, with
each weekly succession, infectious individuals from the active population.
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FIG. 2: Modeling the spread of COVID-19. (a) We constructed a social network with two types
of links: Aij (red) are external links, representing out-of-home interactions at work, public places and
social gatherings; Bij (blue) capture cohabitant links, capturing separate households. In our setting the
network includes N = 104 individuals split among M = 4×103 households. (b) The links in Aij are active
primarily during the day-time, and only between individuals who are not under quarantine. The in-house
connections Bij are activated in the after-hours, or all day when under quarantine. Both networks are
characterized by the degree/household size distributions P (k) and P (m). Their links exhibit sporadic
instances of activity, capturing times when i and j are collocated, and therefore engage in potentially
infectious interaction. Hence, they are characterized by two parameters: T1, T2 capture the typical time
per day in which the links are active, and p1, p2 capture the probability of infection at each such instance
of activity. This captures the fact that (i) cohabitant links are, typically, more active than social links
(T2 > T1); (ii) when activated, cohabitant interactions are often more intimate and therefore potentially
more infectious (p2 > p1). Together these six parameters, balancing the relative roles of Aij and Bij
in the virus transmission, give rise to two observable parameters that help characterize the contagion:
α in (2), quantifying the contribution of external (red) vs. in-house (blue) transmission to the spread;
β in (1), describing the proliferation rate of the virus. (c) We simulated social activity over a period of
T = 150 days, at 15 minute resolution. At each 15 minute instance a fraction of the links are active (dark
red), while the other remain idle. Transmission between i and j can only occur (with probability p1)
at times when Aij is active (on average T1 percent of the time). External links Aij are active primarily
during the day, excluding periods of quarantine. (d) Bij undergo a similar pattern of activity/idling,
with parameters T2, p2, primarily in the evening/night-time, or all day during quarantine.
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FIG. 3: Extracting SARS-CoV-2 infection rate. (a) - (l) We collected data [33] on the infection
levels I(t) vs. t (orange circles) in 12 different countries. Fitting I(t) to an exponential of the form (1)
we evaluate β in each of these countries (blue solid lines). Such exponential growth typically continues
for a period of several days posterior to the instigation of a mitigation policy (grey dashed-lines). We,
therefore, used only the data up to three days after the implementation of social distancing to evaluate β
(Supplementary Section 4.2). (m) Histogram of inferred β values across the 12 countries. Infection rates
are distributed around an average of β = 0.26. Hence, in our simulations we tune the parameters to
obtain this growth rate under the absence of all prophylactic measures. In reality, standard behavioral
practices, such as personal hygiene or avoidance of physical contact, may push β to lower values. To
capture this, in our simulations we incorporate three scenarios: worst case - β ≈ 0.26, intermediate
case - β ≈ 0.2 and best case - β ≈ 0.15. (n) Taking β ≈ 0.26 we simulated the projected evolution
of the COVID-19 pandemic a la` Figs. 1 and 2, without any preventive measures. (o) We focus on
three crucial parameters that characterize the severity of the projected spread: mortality D(t) (grey),
hospitalization level H(t) (purple) and the number of individuals requiring ventilation V (t) (brown).
Absent any intervention, H(t) exceeds, by a large margin, the average national hospitalization capacity
(dashed grey line), estimated at 3×10−3 [34]. Results represent an average over 20 stochastic realizations.
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FIG. 4: The impact of Alternating quarantine. (a) The infection I(t) vs. t of the unmitigated
epidemic (UM, orange), as obtained under β = 0.25 and α = 0. This represents a worst-case scenario,
where beta is taken from the unmitigated spreading data, i.e. lacking prophylactic practices. At t = t0 we
instigate four competing mitigation strategies: Full quarantine (FQ, grey), Alternating quarantine (AQ,
blue), Intermittent quarantines (IQ, turquoise) and Half quarantine (HQ, red). We find that, barring the
idealized FQ, AQ provides the most efficient mitigation, outperforming IQ and HQ. (b) We used three
performance measures to rate mitigation efficiency: Residual mortality ∆D (3), peak hospitalization
HPeak (4) and peak ventilation VPeak. In all three indicators, AQ provides the best outcomes by a
significant margin, as compared to IQ and HQ. (c) - (f) To examine the role of in-house transmission, we
further tested all strategies under medium (α = 0.15) and high (α = 0.32) levels of household infections.
(g) - (l) We repeated the same experiment, this time under a ∼ 20% lower β, capturing the potential
effect of complementary prophylactic measures, such as mask wearing or hygienic behavior. (m) - (r)
In our best case scenario β is further reduced by an additional ∼ 20% factor, this time to β ≈ 0.15.
Together, our analysis scans the space of infection (β) and in-house transmission (α) rates, covering a
range of potentially relevant conditions for COVID-19 mitigation. We find that, under all conditions,
AQ consistently outperforms all contending strategies, providing mitigation that is closest to FQ. Results
represent an average over 20 stochastic realizations. Mitigation is initiated at time t0, set to be the time
when I(t) exceeds 10−3 (Supplementary Section 1.2). In our simulations, the external network Aij was
taken to be an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with average degree 〈k〉 = 15; in Supplementary Section 2
we also examine the case of a scale-free Aij , obtaining similar results. Note that α and β are controlled
indirectly, first through the model parameters (P (k), P (m), T1, T2, p1, p2) as illustrated in Fig. 2b, then
extracted from the observed stochastic simulation results via Eqs. (1) and (2). Consequently, we cannot
control with accuracy the precise values of these parameters. We, therefore, observe slight discrepancies
between the different panels, e.g., β = 0.25 in panel (a) vs. 0.26 in panels (c) and (e). For full size image
see Page 21.
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FIG. 5: The multiplicative effect of Alternating quarantine. We consider three strategies - all
allowing socioeconomic activity (blue) vs. quarantine (red) at half capacity. (a) The Half quarantine
strategy reduces infection by diluting the active population, hence decreasing the rate of infectious inter-
actions. (b) Intermittent quarantines achieve a similar outcome by diminishing the duration of activity,
hence reducing the time of infectious interactions. (c) Our alternating quarantine combines both effects:
on the one hand interactions are limited to individuals within each cohort - diluting the population. On
the other hand these cohorts experience intermittent cycles of work/home - diminishing interaction dura-
tion. The result is a ∼ 4-fold reduction in transmission, alongside a mere 50% reduction in socioeconomic
activity.
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FIG. 6: Testing the population before resuming activity. (a) We combine AQ with testing at
a weekly capacity of χ. Directing all tests towards the quarantined cohort at each week, we prohibit
individuals who tested positive (and their households) from resuming activity. Unsurprisingly, as χ
increases (darker) we observe an enhanced mitigation, thanks to the systematic pruning of infected
individuals from the active cohort. (b) Testing also improved the performance of Intermittent quarantines
(IQ). As opposed to AQ, in IQ, as the entire population transitions from quarantine to activity in unison,
the testing cannot be selectively directed to the quarantined cohort, but rather spread evenly across the
entire population. (c) In the limit where χ→ 0.5, a capacity to screen 50% of the population within one
week, AQ becomes extremely efficient, thanks to its natural partitioning of the population. The entire
quarantined cohort can be tested, and within 1 − 2 weeks AQ has almost no out of home infections.
Indeed, we observe that AQ follows a similar decay as the Full quarantine (FQ, grey), albeit with a
10 day delay, capturing roughly 1 − 2 testing cycles. In contrast, IQ, lacking such partitioning of the
population, exhibits a more minor benefit under the same testing capacity. Simulations represent an
average over 20 stochastic realizations. The in-house infection rate was set to the intermediate level
α ≈ 0.15.
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FIG. 7: Alternating quarantine vs. population-wide quarantine. (a) Infection level I(t) vs. t as
obtained for β = 0.25 under Alternating quarantine (AQ, blue). We also examined population-wide
quarantines at η = 50, 60, 70 and 75% levels (red to yellow). Despite having half of the population active
at all times, AQ’s mitigation is comparable to that of a 70% population-wide quarantine. Hence, instead
of an extremely hurtful socioeconomic shutdown of 70%, nearing the practical upper bound of social
distancing policies, AQ offers a similar outcome under a significantly reduced socioeconomic price-tag.
(b) - (c) Similar results are observed also under our intermediate (β = 0.2) and best case (β = 0.15)
scenarios. Simulations represent an average over 20 stochastic realizations. The in-house infection rate
was set to the medium level α ≈ 0.15. Here Aij is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with 〈k〉 = 15, similar
results under for a scale-free Aij appear in Supplementary Section 2.
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FIG. 8: Driving social conformity for Alternating quarantine. (a) We identify four needs that
inhibit potential cooperation: child care arrangements, work, purchasing supplies or services and outdoor
activities. (b) Infection risk is highest under extensive and continuous interactions, such as in school
or at work, and least significant during open-air activities, such as strolling or exercising. We therefore
focus on moderators mainly for the first three inhibitors. (c) To enhance social compliance we seek
moderators that encourage conformity in lieu of coercive enforcement: School and work. Due to their
liability, schools and workplaces will be naturally prohibited for the quarantined cohort, as both will be
required to abide by the AQ routine, and therefore will not admit workers or students of the inactive
cohort. In addition, routine inspections for symptoms will expose potential defectors who wish to conceal
their infection. Public centers. We consider three moderators to deter individuals from seeking services or
supplies: (i) instruct the population to obtain sufficient supplies in advance for a single week; (ii) establish
a support network in case of unexpected needs; (iii) create a mobile app confirming an individual’s cohort
(1 or 2), that must be displayed upon entry to public centers. Outdoor activity could be moderated by
enforcement, however, since it poses little infection risk, we believe such activity should, in practice, be
ignored. (d) The residual mortality ∆D vs. the fraction of defectors/essential workers f , as obtained for
the intermediate scenario β = 0.20, α = 0.15. We find that AQ is robust under imperfect implementation,
allowing to sustain a ∼ 20% violation, either via formal exemption or by defection. (e) - (f) Similar results
are obtained for HPeak and VPeak; the average estimated national hospitalization capacity is indicated
by the grey dashed-line.
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Fig. 4: The impact of Alternating quarantine. Full size.
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I. MODELING THE SPREAD
A. The unmitigated spread
1. Population network
We consider M households h = 1, . . . ,M , each including mh individuals, where mh is a random
variable extracted from the household size distribution P (m) (Table V). Together these house-
holds comprise the total population, in which the number of individuals i = 1, . . . , N is given
by N =
∑M
h=1mh. Hence, the i-th individual, resides together with her mh − 1 cohabitants at
her household h(i). Taking M = 4 × 103, and the average household size to be 〈m〉 = 2.5, we
arrive at a total population of N = 104 individuals.
To construct the social network Gij , we consider two types of links: Within a household there
are no barriers, hence the in-house connection network Bij is simply a union of disjoint cliques
representing (i, j) ∈ Bij ⇐⇒ h(i) = h(j). This results in M isolated cliques whose size is
distributed via P (m). Out of home connections, Aij , can be potentially drawn between any
pair of nodes i, j, capturing external social links, occurring at work, school or other public
places. The external network Aij can be admit any desired degree distribution P (k) via the
configuration model framework [1]. In our simulations we used two archetypal constructions -
the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random graph (main text), in which P (k) is bounded, and a scale-free
(SF) network, where P (k) ∼ k−3 (Sec. II). In both cases we set the average degree to 〈k〉 = 15.
The final network Gij contains all links in Aij and Bij .
2. Temporality
The links in Gij are not constantly active. Rather, they represent potential infectious inter-
actions, switching between periods of activity, when infections can take place, and inactivity,
when infections are barred. Throughout the daily cycle we have Aij active during the day, 8:00
AM to 8:00 PM, and Bij active during the after-hours, 8:00 PM to 8:00 AM the next day. This
captures a typical routine, in which individuals interact sporadically, i.e. links are switched on
and off, out of home in the day-time, and in-house at night.
Dividing each day into 15 minute segments, ∆t, we generate a random sequence of temporal
activity/inactivity instances for Aij and Bij . During the day, the probability for activation of
each link in Aij per interval ∆t is set to pA. Similarly, during the night we have probability pB
for Bij activation. The result is a stochastic pattern of potentially infectious interactions, in
which the idling time between subsequent instances of activity follows a geometric distribution
Geom(pA) or Geom(pB) for Aij and Bij , respectively. On average, we have Aij links active
T1 = 12pA (5)
hours, and Bij active for
T2 = 12pB (6)
hours, per daily cycle.
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There are two exceptions to the above random activation rules:
• Isolation. In case node i is known to be infected, i.e. symptomatic (Sec. I C), then i’s
entire household h(i) enters isolation. All nodes in h(i) remain at home until the house-
hold is cleared to retain its activity. Under these conditions only Bij is activated with
probability pB throughout the entire 24 hour cycle, and Aij links remain idle. Conse-
quently, when in isolation, in-house interactions become more extensive, as they have
more potential instances of infection, then during periods of normal activity.
• Collocation. For consistency, if at a certain instance, both links (i, j) and (i, k) are
simultaneity active, then the triad link (j, k) is also activated. Indeed, a concurrent col-
location of i, j and i, k, implies, by transitivity, an inevitable collocation also of j, k. This
alllows us to capture potential correlations in the temporal patterns of the interactions.
A summary of all temporal network parameters appears in Table I.
Parameter Description Value
N Population size 104
M Number of households 4× 103
p(k) Aij degree distribution Erdo˝s-Re´nyi or scale-free
p(m) Household size distribution Empirically obtained, Table V
〈k〉 Average Aij degree 15
〈m〉 Average household size 2.5
pA Probability of Aij link activation Varied
pB Probability of Bij link activation Varied
T1 Mean daily infection time via Aij Eq. (5)
T2 Mean daily infection time via Bij Eq. (6)
α Fraction of in-house infections Extracted from data/simulation
β infection growth rate Extracted from data/simulation
TABLE I: The parameters governing the temporal network. We list the relevant quantities under-
lying our temporal network framework. Parameters that are unknown are varied to capture the breadth
of different epidemiological scenarios. For example P (k) is set to be both bounded (main text) or scale-
free (Sec. II); pA, pB are varied in our simulations. Parameters α, β are not set, but rather extracted
from the observed spread, as explained in Sec. I D.
B. Mitigation
During mitigation, the quarantined households express only Bij throughout the 24 hour cycle,
with all their Aij links rendered inactive. If a household member is defective, their Aij links
continue to activate as usual. Partitioning the population, as in AQ or HQ, for example, is
done at household level - namely households are randomly split among the cohorts. In each
realization, we instigate the mitigation at a time t0 when the fraction of infections I(t = t0)
exceeds a significant threshold. We set this threshold at
I(t = t0) =
lnN
N
, (7)
namely the time point where the total infected population is of the order of lnN .
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C. Disease dynamics
We begin with a fully susceptible (S) population, and introduce a small fraction of exposed (E)
individuals. The potential transitions that ensue are shown in Fig. 9, whose main transitions
include:
• Infection. At any encounter between a susceptible node i and a pre-symptomatic or
infected node j, i may become exposed. By encounter we relate to an instance ∆t in which
the i, j link in Aij or Bij is active. The probability of infection at each encounter depends
on the nature of the link, set to p1 for Aij links and p2 for Bij . External interactions Aij ,
between associates, are typically less physical than in-house interactions between e.g.,
family members, hence, typically p2 > p1. In practice, however, we can incorporate these
probabilities into the encounter probabilities themselves, pA, pB. Indeed, stating that
i and j interact with probability pA and then infect with probability p1, is equivalent
to setting their interaction probability to pAp1, and having infections occurring with
100% certainty. Hence, for simplicity we set p1 = p2 = 1, and encapsulate the infection
probabilities within the parameters T1, T2 in (5) and (6).
• Infection classification. During the simulation of the spread we keep count of the type
of each infection. Infections occurring via Bij links add to the in-house infection count
θIn; infections occurring out of home, through Aij contribute to θOut.
• Infection cycle. Once a node becomes exposed it begins to transition between states
according to Fig. 9a. Exposed nodes have contracted the virus, but are not yet infectious.
These nodes are randomly split between ES with probability pS and EAS with probability
pAS = 1 − pS. This decides whether these nodes are pre-symptomatic, and eventually
will develop symptoms, or asymptomatic, reaching recovery R without even experiencing
symptoms. The remaining disease cycle continues according to the illustration. For
example, nodes in ES will later transition to one of the infected stated IM, IS or IC
with probabilities pM = 0.55, pS = 0.1 and pC = 0.05, respectively; the remaining 30%
are accounted for in the EAS trajectory. Similarly, IS nodes, after some time enter the
hospitalized state H, after which the recover with probability pHR = 0.85, and decease
with probability pHD = 0.15.
Note that ventilated individuals V are, by definition, also hospitalized. However, in out
implementation we consider these as two isolated groups, i.e. ventilated vs. hospitalized
without ventilation. Therefore, at all times we have S(t)+E(t)+INS(t)+I(t)+R(t)+V(t)+
H(t) + D(t) = N , comprising the entire population. Presenting our results we used the
normalized compartments S(t) = S(t)/N,E(t) = E(t)/N, INS(t) = INS(t)/N, . . . , which
satisfy
S(t) + E(t) + INS(t) + I(t) +R(t) + V (t) +H(t) +D(t) = 1. (8)
• Transition times. The amount of time a node remains at a state X (other than S) is
chosen at random according to probability density PX(t). We identify specific processes
for which variability in the transition time may impact the effectiveness of alternating
quarantine (AQ). For example, the time from exposure to infectiousness, or the time for
asymptomatic individuals to recover are crucial. Deviations from the mean in these tran-
sition times may interfere with AQ’s disease cycle synchronization. For instance, if a node
remains asymptomatic for, e.g., 3 weeks, which is beyond the average time to recovery,
its infectiousness may spillover between AQ’s subsequent activity cycles, allowing it to
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FIG. 9: The infection cycle of SARS-CoV-2. Extracted from Fig. 1 of the main text.
resume activity while still infectious. Similarly, if the pre-symptomatic stage is extended
significantly beyond the 5 day average, an infected individual in week 1 may not yet de-
velop symptoms during their isolation at week 2, once again, reducing the efficiency of AQ
in removing invisible spreaders. Therefore, for these highly relevant transitions we placed
a special emphasis to avoid underestimating their potential time-scale heterogeneity. In
particular we identified four relevant processes: PEAS(t), the time until an exposed asymp-
tomatic individual (EAS) becomes infectious (IAS); PIAS , the time until an asymptomatic
infectious node recovers; PES(t), the time until an exposed pre-symptomatic individual
(ES) becomes infectious (IPS) and PIS(t), the time for an infectious pre-symptomatic (IPS)
to show symptoms (IM, IS or IC). For these four functions we used a Weibull distribu-
tion, as explained in Sec. IV A. This distribution allows us to capture the potentially
variable time-scales across the population, thus testing AQ under realistically challenging
conditions.
D. Evaluating α and β
Our model parameters control the spreading dynamics via the temporal probabilities pA and
pB, and their subsequent T1 and T2 in (5) and (6), that govern the rate of infections in and out
of home. Once these parameters are set, the simulating results of the unmitigated spread allow
us to evaluate the infection growth rate β and the in-house transmission rate α:
• In-house infection rate α. During the simulation we keep count of the source of all
infections. Infections occurring via Aij , amounting to θOut are external, while those that
transmit along Bij links, θIn, are internal. The parameter α captures the percentage of
transmissions that occurred in-house as
α =
θIn
θIn + θOut
. (9)
• The infection growth rate β. To evaluate β we observe the overall infected population
I(t) vs t at the early stages of the spread, and fit it to an exponential of the form
I(t) ∼ eβt. (10)
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Obtaining the slope of the resulting growth on semi-logarithmic axes we extract β from
the simulation results. Note that β depends on the slope, not on the pre-factor, hence it
is insensitive to the size of the initial outbreak, or to the fraction of cases detected via
testing, providing a fair comparison between different realizations or empirical datasets.
A crucial point is to select the range in t from which to extract the slope. Indeed, for
very small t, due to the stochastic nature of our simulations, I(t) is still small, and still
discrete. In this limit, the observed results are subject to high levels of noise and may not
yet exhibit a clear exponential behavior. On the other hand if t is too large, we approach
the peak of I(t), where the exponential approximation fails again, this time due to the
accumulation of herd immunity. Therefore, to be consistent across all our simulations we
evaluated β from the time window
t?
4
≤ t ≤ t
?
2
(11)
where t? = argmaxI(t) is the time of peak infection. Evaluating β from empirical data is
explained in Sec. IV.
Note, that α and β are not the model parameters. Rather they emerge from the stochastic
simulation results, after setting the model parameters pA and pB. Therefore, we do not have
direct control over these parameters, as seen in, e.g., Fig. 4 of the main text, where α, β
were only approximately equal across the different panels. Roughly speaking, we can link
these parameters to each other. A large pA, pB, for example enhances transmission, and hence
increases β. The parameter α, on the other hand, grows as pB is increased and pA is decreased,
capturing a state in which in-house transmissions are more prevalent than external ones.
II. RESULTS OBTAINED UNDER A SCALE-FREE Aij
Our strategy in testing AQ is to examine it systematically under varying relevant scenarios.
Specifically, for unknown parameters, such as α and β, we simulated an array of different
setting, scanning the space of potential α, β values (e.g., Fig. 4 of main text). Other unknown
factors relate to the structural characteristics of the external network Aij . Most importantly, in
the context of epidemic spreading - its degree distribution, which has been shown to significantly
impact the patterns of spread [2]. To eliminate this potentially confounding factor we now re-
examine AQ, repeating our simulations, this time extracting Aij from the scale-free network
ensemble (P (k) ∼ k−3, N = 104, 〈k〉 = 15). We find, in Figs. 10 and 11 that AQ continues to
provide the optimal mitigation also under these conditions.
III. ALTERNATING QUARANTINE UNDER SELECTIVE ISOLATION
In the main take we used a typical disease cycle, capturing the average individual’s response to
SARS-CoV-2. We now consider two parallel cycles, one for healthy individuals and the other
for the vulnerable, such as people with background diseases or the elderly. The two cycles differ
mainly in their transition probabilities. For example, while only 4% of the healthy individuals
develop critical symptoms (IC), among the vulnerable population the number is set to 10%.
The complete disease cycle for the Typical, Healthy and Vulnerable population [3–5] appears
in Table II.
29
Worst case
(a)
𝑰(
𝒕)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝜶 = 𝟎
𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟔
𝐇
𝐐
𝚫
𝑫
𝑯
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝑽
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
(b)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝐈𝐐 𝐀
𝐐
(c)
𝑰(
𝒕)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟔
𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟒
𝐇
𝐐
𝚫
𝑫
𝑯
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝑽
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
(d)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝐈𝐐 𝐀
𝐐
(e)
𝑰(
𝒕)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟑
𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓
𝐇
𝐐
𝚫
𝑫
𝑯
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝑽
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
(f)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝐈𝐐 𝐀
𝐐
Intermediate case
(g)
𝑰(
𝒕)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝜶 = 𝟎
𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟏
𝐇
𝐐
𝚫
𝑫
𝑯
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝑽
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
(h)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
𝐈𝐐 𝐀
𝐐
(i)
𝑰(
𝒕)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟕
𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟗
𝐇
𝐐
𝚫
𝑫
𝑯
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝑽
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
(j)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
𝐈𝐐 𝐀
𝐐
(k)
𝑰(
𝒕)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟕
𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟏
𝐇
𝐐
𝚫
𝑫
𝑯
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝑽
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
(l)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
𝐈𝐐 𝐀
𝐐
(q)
𝑰(
𝒕)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟕
𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓
𝐇
𝐐
𝚫
𝑫
𝑯
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝑽
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
(r)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
𝐈𝐐 𝐀
𝐐
In
-h
o
u
se
 h
ig
h
Best case
(m)
𝑰(
𝒕)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝜶 = 𝟎
𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟔
𝐇
𝐐
𝚫
𝑫
𝑯
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝑽
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
(n)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
𝐈𝐐 𝐀
𝐐
(o)
𝑰(
𝒕)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟖
𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟒
𝐇
𝐐
𝚫
𝑫
𝑯
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝑽
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
(p)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟒
𝐈𝐐 𝐀
𝐐
In
-h
o
u
se
 lo
w
In
-h
o
u
se
 m
ed
iu
m
FIG. 10: The impact of alternating quarantine for a scale-free Aij. Reconstructing Fig. 4 of the
main text, this time using a scale-free external network.
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FIG. 11: Alternating quarantine vs. population-wide quarantine on a scale-free Aij. Recon-
structing Fig. 7 of the main text, this time using a scale-free external network.
30
𝑯
(𝒕
)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
(𝐛) (𝐜)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
(𝐚)
𝑽
(𝒕
)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
(𝐞) (𝐟)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
(𝐝)
𝑫
(𝒕
)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
(𝐡) (𝐢)
𝒕 (𝐝𝐚𝐲𝐬)
(𝐠)
𝐇𝐐 𝐈𝐐 𝐀𝐐
𝐔𝐌⋆
𝐇𝐐⋆
𝐈𝐐⋆
𝐀𝐐⋆
𝐔𝐌
𝐇𝐐
𝐈𝐐
𝐀𝐐
𝐇𝐐 𝐈𝐐 𝐀𝐐
𝐇𝐐 𝐈𝐐 𝐀𝐐
𝑯
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝑽
𝐏
𝐞
𝐚
𝐤
𝚫
𝑫
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟑 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟑 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
× 𝟏𝟎−𝟑 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟑 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟑
FIG. 12: The impact of selective isolation on the different mitigation approaches. (a) The
fraction of hospitalized individuals H(t) vs. t under no mitigation (light orange, UM), intermittent
quarantine (IQ, light turquoise), half quarantine (HQ, light red) and alternating quarantine (AQ, light
blue). (b) Similar results (dark colors), this time with selectively isolating the vulnerable population.
(c) Peak hospitalization under all strategies with (light) and without (dark) selective isolation. (d) -
(f) Ventilated population V (t) vs. t with/without selective isolation. (g) - (i) Mortality D(t) and the
residual mortality ∆D.
To track the spread in the presence of healthy/vulnerable populations we repeated the simulation
described in Sec. I, this time splitting the population into 80% healthy and 20% vulnerable nodes
[6]. We track three indicators that help us assess the performance of all strategies (Fig. 12):
Hospitalization rate H(t), ventilation rate V (t) and mortality D(t). As expected, AQ (Fig.
12)a,d,g, light blue) continues to outperform IQ (light turquoise) and HQ (light red) also under
this variable disease cycle.
Next, we added an additional component of selective isolation, in which the vulnerable nodes
(20%) remain under constant quarantine. For example, in AQ this implies that the weekly alter-
nations are limited only to the healthy 80%. Under these conditions the vulnerable individuals
cannot be infected via external links Aij . They can still, however, experience secondary infec-
tion through Bij , in case one of their healthy cohabitants contracted the virus. As expected,
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such selective isolation enhances the performance of all the strategies, lowering hospitalization,
ventilation and mortality (Fig. 12b,e,h). This improvement, we emphasize, is not unique to
AQ, making it clear that selective isolation is a desirable component within any mitigation
strategy. In Fig. 12c,f,i we present our three performance measures, HPeak, VPeak and ∆D with
(dark) and without (light) selective isolation, further indicating the importance of protecting
the vulnerable population.
Probability Typical Healthy Vulnerable
pAS 0.3 0.32 0.25
pM 0.55 0.56 0.45
pS 0.1 0.08 0.2
pC 0.05 0.04 0.1
pHR 0.85 0.86 0.79
pHD 0.15 0.14 0.21
pV R 0.5 0.5 0.5
pV D 0.5 0.5 0.5
TABLE II: Transition probabilities between COVID-19 states. We constructed three disease
cycles - the Typical cycle, used in the main text, the Healthy cycle, capturing the impact of the disease
on healthy individuals, and the Vulnerable cycle, adapted to individuals of age or ones with pre-existing
conditions.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND PARAMETER SELECTION
A. Constructing the distributions PX(t)
Most of the parameters described in Section I were chosen based on observed values of the
characteristic SARS-CoV-2 infection cycle. For the density functions PX(t), we have used a
Weibull or a Geometric distribution, the former - inspired both by other infections of the
Corona variety [7], as well as recent inidcations pretainig to SARS-CoV-2 [8–10]. The Weibull
distribution allows for potentially high variability across the population, providing a challenging
testing ground for AQ.
To estimate the parameters of the Weibull distributions we collected data on the average TAv
and median TMed of the relevant transition times [7, 8]. This allowed us to infer the Weibull
parameters λ and k via
TAv = λΓ(1 + 1/k);
TMed = λ(ln 2)
1/k.
As median values were available only for PIAS and PIPS , we first calculated the parameter k for
these transitions, obtaining, for both k = 1.47. This is not surprising as k, the shape parameter,
controls the type of the Weibull distribution, which is expected to be similar for processes driven
by similar mechanisms. This is as opposed to λ, the location parameter, which is not intrinsic
to the shape of the distribution, but rather shifts right or left as the mean is changed. Hence,
it is expected that k is uniform for the different transition-time distributions, while λ may
change according to their mean. With this in mind, we estimated k = 1.47 for the other two
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distributions, PEAS and PES , where the median was inaccessible from data. See Table III for
the different values of mean, and median we have used, and the inferred λ and k.
Duration Distribution Observations Parameters
Mean Median λ k
PEAS(t) Weibull 4 3.44
∗ 4.42 1.47∗
PIAS(t) Weibull 10 8.6 11.04 1.47
PES(t) Weibull 2 1.72
∗ 2.21 1.47∗
PIPS(t) Weibull 5 4.3 5.52 1.47
Mean p
PIM(t) Geometric 5 0.2
PIS(t) Geometric 4 0.25
PIC(t) Geometric 3 0.333
PIH(t) Geometric 11 0.091
PIV(t) Geometric 13 0.077
TABLE III: Estimating the distribution parameters. With data on the mean and median transi-
tion times, we reconstructed the distributions PX(t). For the first four transitions we used a Weibull
distribution, since the potentially high variability is key for testing AQ. The remaining distributions were
taken to be Geometric, since only the mean matters for these transitions. Asterisked median values are
reconstructed.
B. Estimating the infection growth β
As defined above, the parameter β represents the exponential growth rate of the known infectious
nodes I(t) := IM (t) + IS(t) + IC(t). This parameter is difficult to predict directly from the
knwon disease time-scales, especially as the infection rate is hidden, hence we must infer it from
observation. Moreover, as the disease progresses, precautions like social distancing and wearing
masks affect both the rate of interaction and the probability of infection, leading β to change
over time. Therefore, to asses β for the unmitigated spread, we have focus on the period before
such measures were taken.
We collected data on the number of confirmed cases in 12 countries. These countries have
been selected for their prominent number of casesm and to obtain a balanced representation
between southern and northern hemisphere destinations. The data set was compiled by and
obtained from the Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and Engineering (JHU
CSSE) on April 11th 2020 and is available online here: https://data.humdata.org/dataset/novel-
coronavirus-2019-ncov-cases [11].
To capture the relevant time-window for the exponential growth approximation we used data-
points starting 5 days before lock-down and ending 3 days after it. Indeed, earlier than this
point, cases may be underestimated by a yet unprepared system, and beyond this window, the
lock-down may begin affecting the observed slope. As clearly seen in Fig. 3 of the main text,
within this time-window the spread I(t) can be well-approximated by an exponential growth of
the form (10). To extract the slope we used linear regression on ln I(t), yielding the estimator
βˆ for the growth rate in each country, as detailed in Table IV and in Fig. 13. We find that
estimators are narrowly distributed around an average of β = 0.26, the value we used as our
default, i.e. unmitigated spreading parameter.
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FIG. 13: The variability of infection rates across countries. Histogram of the estimator βˆ values
by countries.
Country Population First case Lock-down βˆ
Italy 60 10 38 0.32
USA 328 3 61 0.3
Spain 47 19 43 0.34
Israel 9 36 54 0.19
Germany 83 7 52 0.26
Norway 5.4 38 49 0.32
Colombia 52 49 56 0.28
Argentina 45 45 50 0.22
Netherlands 17 39 54 0.21
N. S. Wales 8 5 52 0.18
Austria 9 35 45 0.3
UK 56 10 46 0.29
TABLE IV: Estimating β per country. Population is given in millions. First case and Lock-down are
given in days relative to 22/1. The parameter βˆ represents the estimation for β, as extracted from the
relevant country data. See Fig. 13 for a histogram of βˆ.
C. Estimating the household size distribution P (m)
We used a United Nations database [12] to collect data on the distribution of household sizes
across different countries. The data, summarized in Table V, was compiled by and obtained
from the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population division.
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Country 1 2-3 4-5 6 Average
Italy 0.31 0.47 0.21 0.01 2.4
Germany 0.39 0.47 0.13 0.01 2.05
USA 0.28 0.49 0.19 0.04 2.5
Israel 0.21 0.4 0.28 0.11 3.14
Spain 0.19 0.53 0.26 0.02 2.69
Norway 0.4 0.41 0.18 0.01 2.22
Model 0.3 0.46 0.2 0.04 2.6
TABLE V: Household size distribution P (m) per country. For each country we show the fraction
of households with 1, 2−3, 4−5 or 6 cohabitants, as obtained from the UN database [12]. We also show
the average household size in each country.
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